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When a stimulus repeatedly and rapidly changes color (e.g., between red and green) and motion direction (e.g., upwards and
downwards) with the same frequency, it was found that observers were most likely to pair colors and motion directions when the
direction changes lead the color changes by approximately 80ms. This is the color–motion asynchrony illusion. According to the
differential processing time model, the illusion is explained because the neural activity leading to the perceptual experience of
motion requiresmore time than that of color. Alternatively, the timemarkermodel attributes themisbinding to a failure inmatching
different sorts of changes at rapid alternations. Here, running counter to the time marker model, we demonstrate that the illusion
can arise with a single direction change. Using this simpliﬁed version of the illusion we also show that, although some form of
visual masking takes place between colors, the measured asynchrony genuinely reﬂects processing time differences.
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Introduction
What is the relationship between the timing of neural
activity and the subjective time course of events represented
by that activity? This question has recently been discussed in
the context of the color–motion asynchrony illusion (Arnold,
2005; Arnold & Clifford, 2002; Arnold, Clifford, &
Wenderoth, 2001; Bedell, Chung, Ogmen, & Patel, 2003;
Johnston & Nishida, 2001; Moradi & Shimojo, 2004;
Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; Nishida & Johnston, 2002). This
striking illusion occurs when a stimulus repeatedly and
rapidly changes color (e.g., between red and green) and
motion direction (between two opposite directions) with the
same frequency. In order to reliably bind one direction of
motion with one color, direction changes must occur about
80 ms earlier than color changes (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997).
According to the differential processing time explanation
(Arnold & Clifford, 2002; Bedell et al., 2003; Moutoussis &
Zeki, 1997), the illusion occurs because different attributes
of a visual stimulus are processed in relatively separate
cortical areas (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988). It is proposed
that the subjective time course of changes in a visual at-
tribute is related to the timing of neural activity of the areas
that process this attribute. The illusion is thus explained
because the neural activity leading to the perceptual
experience of motion requires more time than that of color.
Alternatively, it has been argued that the perceived time of
occurrence may not correlate directly with neural process-
ing time and would be, instead, the result of an interpre-
tative process of the brain (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992;
Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Johnston & Nishida, 2001;
Krekelberg, 2003; Walsh, 2002).
A hallmark of this illusion is that it seems to require a
repetitive display in which the time interval between two
successive changes is very short (È300 ms) (Arnold, 2005;
Arnold & Clifford, 2002; Arnold et al., 2001; Bedell et al.,
2003; Clifford, Spehar, & Pearson, 2004; Moutoussis &
Zeki, 1997; Nishida & Johnston, 2002). Nishida and
Johnston (2002) specifically addressed this question. They
asked observers to perform a synchronous judgment task;
that is, they asked observers to make a yes–no judgment
about whether or not the two attribute oscillations were
perfectly in phase while varying the relative phase between
color and motion changes. They found the color–motion
asynchrony illusion when the time between two successive
changes was 250 ms, which replicated previous results.
However, they showed by increasing the time between two
successive changes that the perceived asynchrony
decreased until it disappeared when the time interval was
2000 ms. Furthermore, the order of a single change in
motion direction and a single change in color was reliably
perceived (Bedell et al., 2003; Nishida & Johnston, 2002).
These findings posed a challenge to simple versions of the
differential processing time explanation that predict a
motion delay regardless of the frequency of changes.
Nishida and Johnston proposed the time marker explana-
tion as an alternative (Nishida & Johnston, 2002). This ex-
planation for the illusion claims that the misbinding is due
to a failure in matching the neural representations (time
markers) of the different sort of changes. They argue that at
the high temporal frequencies that characterize the illusion,
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the second-order changes in position (motion changes) are
difficult to detect. Consequently, the first-order changes in
color are matched with the first-order changes in position
(motion direction) resulting in perceived asynchronies.
However, a recent version of the differential processing
time explanation (Bedell et al., 2003) suggests that the
critical factor for the appearance of the illusion is the type
of judgment that observers perform rather than the mis-
matching between time markers at high frequencies. The
model proposes that judgments of correspondence between
attributes (e.g., which direction is the red stimulus moving)
imply the use of sustained information for which the dif-
ferences in processing time between color and motion are
significant, whereas temporal order judgments (e.g., did the
color change occur after or before the direction change)
involve transient information for which the differences in
processing time are not significant. Accordingly, the illu-
sion will appear only when a correspondence task will be
performed, but not for a temporal order judgment task.
However, as previously mentioned, Nishida and Johnston
(2002) required observers to perform a synchronous judg-
ment task. This task is more similar to a temporal order
judgment task than to a correspondence task. Therefore, the
differential processing time model of Bedell et al. (2003)
would not predict an asynchrony. Nishida and Johnston,
however, did observe the typical asynchrony for high
frequencies. How can this apparent contradictory result be
explained? Bedell et al. proposed that observers may have
changed the task depending on the temporal frequency.
That is, although observers were asked to perform a
synchronous judgment task, they may have instead per-
formed a correspondence task for high frequencies.
In the present study, we show that, in opposition to the
time marker explanation, a single change in motion direction
demonstrates the perceived asynchrony that characterizes
the illusion. Using this simplified display we show that,
although it does not contribute to the measured asynchrony,
some form of visual masking takes place between colors.
Furthermore, we also show that motion signals briefly dis-
played after a direction reversal are not perceived, reveal-
ing what we think is the origin of the illusion.
General methods
The stimuli were displayed on a 21-in. CRT monitor
(Sony Trinitron GM 520) at a refresh rate of 100 Hz viewed
binocularly from a distance of 50 cm in a dimly lit room.
It consisted of 200 dots (size: 0.11-  0.11-) randomly
distributed in a circular aperture with a diameter of 8- of
visual angle on a dark background. All dots moved
coherently at 6-/s. The dots could be red (luminance:
17 Cd/m2; chromaticity: 0.62, 0.34) or green (luminance:
17 Cd/m2; chromaticity: 0.28, 0.61). Three observers partic-
ipated in the experiment, the first author and two observers
who were naBve as to the purposes of the study. Observers
reported normal, or corrected to normal, visual acuity and
color vision. Observers were instructed to maintain fixation
on a cross, presented at the center of the aperture. A dem-
onstration of the stimuli can be found at http://www.ub.edu/
pbasic/visualperception/joan/en/demos.html.
Experiment 1
According to the time marker explanation (Nishida &
Johnston, 2002), the use of a repetitive display is a
necessary condition for the illusion to appear. However,
according to the differential processing time explanation
suggested by Bedell et al. (2003), the critical factor is the
type of task: performing a correspondence task would lead
to perceptual asynchrony whereas temporal order judg-
ments would not. Bedell et al., however, used a repetitive
display and so it is not entirely clear whether the corre-
spondence task requires repetitive changes. Here, we test
both explanations by performing two types of tasks (a corre-
spondence task and a temporal order judgment task) using
a variation of the typical cycle displays (Arnold, 2005;
Arnold & Clifford, 2002; Arnold et al., 2001; Bedell et al.,
2003; Clifford et al., 2004; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997;
Nishida & Johnston, 2002) in which only a single change in
motion direction was presented.
Methods
Correspondence task
We studied the perceptual binding of color around a single
direction change when observers performed a correspon-
dence task. Three experimental conditions were randomized
within each session:
180- direction change: The stimulus (diagrammatic
representation of the temporal relationship between color
and motion changes in Figure 1A) consisted of 200 ran-
dom dots that were displayed for 300 ms moving either
upward or downward (at random in each trial). After this
interval, the dots abruptly reversed direction maintain-
ing it up to the end of the trial. The color of the dots was
red during an interval of 300 ms close to the direction
change. Before this red interval the dots were green, and
after that the dots were green again for 300 ms, after
which the dots disappeared. Consequently, the display con-
sisted of one direction change and two color changes.
The relative timing between the red interval and the di-
rection change was varied from trial to trial (see below).
90- direction change: The stimulus (diagrammatic rep-
resentation in Figure 1B) was the same as described
above except that the direction change was 90- either to
the right or to the left (at random in each trial).
Without last color interval: The stimulus (diagrammatic
representation in Figure 1D) was the same of the 180-
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direction change condition except that the dots disap-
peared after the red interval. That is, the last green in-
terval was not displayed.
Observers performed a motion correspondence task; that
is, they made judgments about the predominant direction of
motion (the first or the second direction of motion) when the
dots were red (two forced-choice judgment). The relative
timing between the direction change and the red interval
varied from trial to trial. We assigned a relative timing of
zero in the situation where the red interval was centered on
the direction change. Hence, the dots were red during 150 ms
before and 150 ms after the direction change. We denoted
positive values of the relative timing for those values in
which the direction change occurred before the point of time
that corresponded to the center of the red interval and neg-
ative values for those in which the direction change oc-
curred after that point. Eight relative timings ranging from
j100 to 250 ms in increments of 50 ms were used.
Each observer performed two different sessions: one in
which the target color was red (as described above) and an-
other in which the colors were reversed and the target color
was green. The order was counterbalanced across subjects.
For the sake of clarity, hereafter we will refer to red as the
target color. During a session, each relative timing was sam-
pled 20 times according to the method of constant stimuli.
Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the temporal relationship between color and motion for each condition and results in form of
individual psychometric functions in Experiment 1. (A) A single change in motion direction was sufﬁcient to obtain the asynchrony between
color and motion. The distribution of solid circles shows the proportions of trials in which the second direction of motion was reported for
red dots as a function of the relative timing between the direction change and the center of the red interval. (B) A direction change of 90-
strongly reduced the asynchrony (distribution of diamonds). (C) When a temporal order judgment was made between the direction change
and the ﬁrst change in color no asynchrony appeared (unﬁlled circles). (D) Removing the last green interval in the ﬁrst condition resulted
in the same asynchrony. The horizontal segments around the PSE correspond to 95% conﬁdence intervals of the mean of the cumulative
Gaussian function obtained with bootstrap method.
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Temporal order judgment task
The stimuli were identical to the 180- condition. The only
difference was the task performed by the observers. In this
case, whether the direction change occurred before or after
the first color change was to be reported (diagrammatic rep-
resentation in Figure 1C). For this task, we assigned a rela-
tive timing of zero to the situation in which the color and
the motion change were physically synchronous. Positive
and negative values corresponded to the situations in which
the color change followed or preceded, respectively, the
direction change. Eight relative timings ranged from j150
to 200 ms in steps of 50 ms were used. The sessions were
administered exactly as in the correspondence task, as were
the relative timing values. Subjects performed the task in
different orders.
Data analysis
For the correspondence task, the set of data of each par-
ticipant provided a distribution of the proportion of trials in
which the second direction was paired with red color as a
function of the relative timing between the direction change
and the center of the red interval. For the temporal order
judgment task, the distribution denotes the proportion of
trials in which the first color change is reported as oc-
curring after the direction change. We fitted cumulative
Gaussian to derive the point of subjective equality (the
mean of the distribution), which served as a measure of the
perceptual asynchrony. If the pairing was veridical, the dis-
tribution would be centered on 0. Positive values would
correspond to apparent motion delays (motion–color asyn-
chrony illusion) and negative values to apparent color de-
lays. In order to obtain the 95% confidence intervals of the
parameters of the cumulative Gaussian functions, we used
the parametric bootstrap method (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993)
as conducted by Kanai, Sheth, and Shimojo (2004). When
conclusions could not be drawn by merely looking at the
overlap between two confidence intervals, parametric boot-
strap and Monte Carlo simulations were used to compare
two given psychometric curves by testing the null hy-
pothesis that the observed difference between points of
subjective equality PSEs (or the two slopes) is not different
than zero. To accomplish this, we used the same procedure
as that implemented in PFCMP (Wichmann & Hill, 2001a,
2001b); however, we computed a bootstrap p value inde-
pendently for each parameter (Lo´pez-Moliner & Linares,
2006) instead of a combined (PSE and slope) one as was
carried out in PFCMP.
Results and discussion
Figure 1 (solid circles) shows the proportion of trials in
which the second direction of motion was reported for red
dots (correspondence task) as a function of the relative
timing between the 180- direction change and the center of
the red interval (individual results). If the pairing was
veridical, the distribution of results would be centered on a
relative timing of 0. However, the distribution is centered
around 73 ms (mean across observers) reflecting the typical
delay in the perception of motion. Actually, when the red
interval was physically centered on the direction change
(relative timing of zero), observers bound the second direc-
tion of motion with red in only 5% of the trials.
One important property of the illusion is that it depends on
the angle between the two directions of motion (Arnold &
Clifford, 2002; Bedell et al., 2003; Clifford et al., 2004),
with a direction change of 180- producing the maximum
asynchrony. Thus, if the angle decreases, so must the
illusory effect. Precisely, this result is the main current
evidence contrary to the time marker model because a
direction change is a second-order change independently of
the specific directions of motion. In order to make sure that
the measured shift reflected a perceived asynchrony not
confounded with response biases in favor of the first direc-
tion, we also measured the magnitude of the illusion for an
angle of 90- between directions (distribution of solid dia-
monds in Figure 1). As expected, the asynchrony decreased
significantly ( p G .001). The average value of the asyn-
chrony for this case was 26 ms.
We have thus shown that when a correspondence task is
performed, against the time marker explanation, a single
direction reversal suffices to obtain a similar asynchrony
between color and motion as those reported elsewhere using
repetitive displays (Arnold, 2005; Arnold & Clifford, 2002;
Arnold et al. 2001; Bedell et al., 2003; Clifford et al., 2004;
Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; Nishida & Johnston, 2002).
For the temporal order judgment task, in agreement with
previously reported results (Bedell et al., 2003; Nishida and
Johnston, 2002), we found that observers judged the tem-
poral order very accurately (distribution of unfilled circles
in Figure 1, notice that in this case the relative timing is
between the direction change and the first color change and
the ordinate represents Bdirection change occurring first[).
This shows that the critical factor is the task; hence, the ob-
tained patterns were not an artifact of the new stimulus we
have used.
Repetitive stimulation has been considered a necessary
condition for the color–motion asynchrony illusion to occur
(see for example the review of visual illusions of Eagleman,
2001). Explaining this has proven to be a major obstacle to
the differential processing time explanation because there is
no reason why the latency for perceiving a change of mo-
tion direction, for example, should depend on whether this
change appears in isolation or is embedded in other direc-
tion changes. Here, however, we solve this problem by
showing that a single direction change is sufficient for mo-
tion to be systematically bound to a color that appears later
in time.
According to the time marker explanation, the illusion
arises because direction changes are difficult to detect when
displayed at high frequencies. In the present investigation,
although only used a single directional change, an attempt
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was made to maintain the similarity with previous studies
reporting the illusion. Accordingly, we showed the first
direction of motion for a very short time (300 ms). It could
be argued that our results can still be accommodated by the
time marker explanation considering that when motion is
displayed for such a short interval of time, the detection of
the direction change is impaired as in the case of several
direction changes displayed at high frequencies. However,
our finding showing accurate temporal order judgments
demonstrates that the direction change could be correctly
detected. Furthermore, it could also be suggested that the
detection of the direction change is only impaired when a
correspondence task is performed. But in this case, as the
task involves the use of sustained information, it is not clear
how the time marker explanation, which is formulated for
temporal order judgments between events, can be applied.
Therefore, our results run counter to the time marker
explanation (Nishida & Johnston, 2002) and are consistent
with the differential processing time explanation of Bedell
et al. (2003) for which the critical factor to obtain a percep-
tual asynchrony consists in performing a correspondence
task between attributes. Interestingly, a similar dependence
on task was found using the attributes of color and orien-
tation (Clifford, Arnold, & Pearson, 2003). However, the
question still remains as to why Nishida and Johnston
(2002) find the illusion for rapid alternations even when
they asked observers to perform a synchrony task (that is
similar to a temporal order judgment task). We think, as
Bedell et al. proposed, that for rapid alternations subjects
might perform a correspondence task instead of a synchrony
task. As subjects were explicitly asked to make synchrony
judgments, we suggest that this hypothetical switch they
made to a correspondence task might be due to the im-
possibility of performing a synchrony task under conditions
of rapid alternations. We think that this may somehow be
related to attentional limitations.
In order to maintain consistency with typical repetitive
displays, we presented 300 ms of green color following the
color target interval (red). However, according to the
differential processing time explanation the asynchrony
should occur regardless of the presence of this last color
interval. To further ensure that the asynchrony that we
measured is not caused by an influence of the last green
interval over the red interval following the direction change,
we eliminated the last green interval (Figure 1D). Indeed,
the distribution corresponding to this manipulation (solid
triangles in Figure 1) completely overlaps with the one
having green as the last color. Hence, consistent with the
differential processing time explanation, the perceived
asynchrony does not depend on the presence of the last
color interval.
However, upon questioning the observers, all of them
reported experiencing a different percept when the last green
interval was not present (compare the two demos shown in
the Web page): they observed the red color moving in the
two directions of motion more frequently. In contrast, they
saw red moving in the second direction of motion much less
often when the last green color interval was present. As
observers were required to bind red to the predominant
direction, this misperception of red color in the second
direction would not affect the measured asynchrony. So as to
explore this possible influence of the last green interval in
the perceived color after the direction change, we carried out
Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 we showed that, inconsistent with the
time marker explanation, the perceptual asynchrony be-
tween color and motion can be observed when a corre-
spondence task is performed on a single direction change.
We also showed that the interval of color that followed the
color on which the task was performed did not contribute to
the measured asynchrony. However, informal reports of
observers suggested that the color of the stimulus presented
after the color target had an effect on the visibility of the
color target. In Experiment 2, we explored this issue using
a similar stimulus, but changing the task: observers were
asked to report the number of directions they saw for the
target color when the last color interval was present or
absent. We hypothesize that if the last green color interval
makes the perception of the red color difficult after the
direction change, then the red color moving in two
directions would be reported less frequently with respect
to the situation where the last green color interval was
absent.
Methods
The stimuli were very similar to that of Experiment 1
except that red is always presented 150 ms before the
direction change and the amount of red after the direction
change was varied on a trial-to-trial basis (see Figure 2). In
this experiment, observers had to report whether they saw
one or two directions of motion for red while varying the
presence (Figures 2B and 2D) or absence (Figures 2A
and 2C) of the last green color interval. We used two
angles for the direction change: 180- (Figures 2A and
2B) and 90- (Figures 2C and 2D). Within one session,
each relative timing value was sampled on 20 occasions
according to the method of constant stimuli. Each
observer performed two sessions with the color target
being different in each one.
Results and discussion
Figure 2 shows the proportion of two directions reported
for red while varying the amount of red presented in the
second direction (data pooled over all participants). The
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mean of the distribution indicates how long red must be
shown along the second direction for observers to report
two directions for red color in 50% of trials.
When the last green color interval was absent we found a
mean of 55 ms for the 180- direction change (distribution of
triangles in Figure 2) and a mean of 19 ms for the 90-
direction change (distribution of diamonds in Figure 2).
These results show that when the dots move along the sec-
ond direction for very short times, this direction of motion
is not perceived. Interestingly, the mean is significantly
reduced for the direction change of 90- with respect to the
180- condition ( p G .001) and in a magnitude very similar
to that reported in Experiment 1. This suggests that the
perceptual delay in motion perception, as measured in
Experiment 1, reflects that motion signal needs integration
time to reach awareness (Burr & Santoro, 2001) and that
this time depends on the former direction of motion. As the
maximum asynchrony is obtained when reversing the direc-
tion, we think, as stated elsewhere (Arnold & Clifford, 2002;
Bedell et al., 2003; Clifford et al., 2004), that mechanisms
of opponency in MT underlie this perceptual asynchrony
(Snowden, Treue, Erickson, & Andersen, 1991).
When the last green interval was present, the red dots had
to be shown moving along the second direction for a slightly
longer time (mean of 73 ms) to be equally perceived moving
in one or two directions in comparison to when green was
absent ( p G .001 for the 180- condition distribution of
squares in Figure 2). For the 90- condition (distribution of
circles in Figure 2), this difference was not significant. In
agreement with an effect of the last green interval, one
would expect larger differences in the PSE (e.g., curve
shifted further to the right when the green is present). We
think that the lack of such an effect might have been caused
by a response bias that shifts the curve to the left. The fact
that subjects responded in several trials Btwo directions[
for the relative timing of 0 for which red only is presented
in one direction may reflect this bias. In any case, it is clear
that the last green interval has an effect on the visibility of
the red interval, which is shown by the significant variation
of the slopes for the two angle conditions. The standard
Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of the temporal relationship between color and motion for each condition and data pooled over all
participants in Experiment 2. Observers had to decide whether red color was perceived in one or two directions of motion while the
relative timing between the direction change and the offset of red color was manipulated. (A) Direction change of 180- without last green
interval. (B) Direction change of 180- with last green interval. (C) Direction change of 90- without last green interval. (D) Direction change
of 90- without last green interval.
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deviation increased from 25 to 97 ms for the 180- condition
and from 11 to 64 ms for the 90- condition presumably
reflecting a higher difficulty of the task.
Our findings share similarities with previous results pub-
lished by Moradi and Shimojo (2004). They also reported a
misbinding of color and motion within a single event. In
one condition of their Experiment 5, observers were asked
to report the color of a briefly moving surface that became
perceptually segregated. During motion, the dots inside this
surface were gray and the color switched back to green
when they stopped. Subjects reported the color following
motion offset more often than gray, which was the actual
color during motion. Moradi and Shimojo regarded this re-
sult as the onset of a new surface triggering the analysis
of the properties (including color) of the surface. They sug-
gested that these properties are computed during a temporal
window of 50–150 ms following the onset of the surface.
Remarkably, the gray color was not perceived even when
presented for 120 ms. As the temporal window of analysis
lasts for 150 ms at the most, this implies that the color is
not treated uniformly during the time window of analysis
(Arnold, 2005) but it is temporally weighted distinctly
favoring color information available later in time.
We think that another, and maybe simpler, explanation
of the effect of the last color interval could be backward
masking (Bachman, 1994). According to it, the last green
color interval would mask red color in the last part of the
red color interval. This account does not require any direc-
tion change to work. Thus, regardless of the direction change,
a fixed quantity of red color would be masked. Although, it
may seem contradictory, we think this is consistent with the
fact that the difference ( p G .001) between the two direction
changes (90- and 180-) has the same trend as when the last
color interval is absent: the last green color interval could
mask a physically longer interval of red presented after a
direction change of 180- simply because the first part of
motion is not perceived in this case (last interval absent
condition).
In summary, taking into account the results of
Experiments 1 and 2, we believe that in a typical cycle
display with several alternations, the perceived asynchrony
genuinely reflects differential processing latencies between
color and motion: perceptual experience of motion is
delayed when motion in the opposite direction is previously
displayed. However, we show that some form of visual
masking also contributes to the percept making the
perception of color after direction changes more difficult
and facilitating the pairing of colors with directions
presented before direction changes.
Conclusions
The color–motion asynchrony illusion has been used to
study the temporal perception of events and the binding of
visual attributes. The asynchrony is typically measured using
repetitive displays in which the relative phase between mo-
tion direction changes and color changes is varied using the
entire range of the cycle. One advantage of such displays is
that any response bias should be eliminated. Here, we did
not follow this tradition because we were interested in the
binding between motion and color when only a single change
was displayed. Although this might have created some re-
sponse bias, it cannot account for the whole perceptual asyn-
chrony we found as shown by the dependency on the angle.
In Experiment 1, using a single direction change display,
we showed that the perceived asynchrony cannot be
explained according to the time marker explanation. How-
ever, the results were perfectly compatible with the differ-
ential processing time explanation for which the differences
in processing time between attributes result in perceptual
differences. Importantly, the asynchrony arose when a cor-
respondence task was made, but not for temporal order judg-
ments. This means that the perceptual delay of motion is
not a fixed quantity but depends on the mechanisms en-
gaged in the task. Normally, the delay in motion percep-
tion is associated with mechanisms of opponency of MT.
The results of Experiment 2 without a last color interval
following the color target support this view: motion needs
integration time below a threshold to be perceived, and this
integration time depends on the direction of motion before
the change being maximum when the directions are totally
opposed.
Although in Experiment 1, we showed, using a typical
task of pairing, that the color interval that follows the color
target interval has no effect on the measured asynchrony,
the results of Experiment 2 with a color interval following
the color target showed that this last color interval had a
perceptual effect of masking.
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